The nature of the Bolshevik takeover in October 1917 Coursework

The nature of the Bolshevik takeover in October 1917 - Coursework Example There are some scholars like (C) and (D) who show Provisional Government’s only failure was perhaps to adequately deal with the rising power of Kornilov and the mishandling of the entire Kornilov affair. Others like (B) show clearly how Lenin was able to cleverly take advantage of the multiple and varied failures of the Provisional Government on diverse accounts ranging from food shortages, poor working conditions and the economic maladies. However there are others like (A) who offer a very weak interpretation of the events that perpetuated in the Bolshevik revolution of October 1917 and hence does not add anything substantial to the debate on the role of the failure of the provisional government in the rise of the Bolsheviks. This is tersely and aptly put across in (B) where the authors delineate the growing discontentment of almost all sections of the Soviet society with the Provisional Government and the increasing influence of Lenin who promised a better life to all. However, both (C) and (D) have postulated the Bolsheviks’ rise to power only as an offshoot of the failure of the Provisional Government to deal with the Kornilov affair. â€Å"The Bolsheviks were the principal beneficiaries of the Kornilov crisis, winning their first majority in the Petrograd Soviet on 31 August† shows that (C) simply links the Kornilov crisis with the Bolsheviks winning the Petrograd Soviet; as also does, â€Å"in party-political terms, the prime beneficiary of this reaction to the Kornilov affair was the Bolshevik party† in (D). Both (C) and (D) have highlighted the Kornilov affair and Kerensky’s lack of insight and management of it as the prime causes leading to the Bolshevik’s gains. ... Both (C) and (D) have highlighted the Kornilov affair and Kerensky’s lack of insight and management of it as the prime causes leading to the Bolshevik’s gains. However, this was just one isolated incidence, and this (Kornilov affair) too was an outcome of the failure of the Provisional Government on many different levels which are well and succinctly explained by (B). Also, (A) is completely off the mark and provides no information or insight on the topic under discussion; instead (A) reflects on the serendipity of Bolsheviks’rising to power at all. While this makes a good and interesting read, (A)’s reminiscences go waste when it comes to evaluating the role played by the failures of the Provisional Government in the rise of Bolsheviks. In fact, if anything (A) provides some dubious evidence to support the contention that the Provisional Government was seen such a failure by the soviet masses and the military, that even in spite of the many exigencies and limitations, the Bolsheviks were able to gain mass support at the grassroot level and come to power. In contrast, (B) provides substantial evidence to support the believe that it was the failure of the Provisional Government that allowed the Bolshevik to stage a coup in October 1917 and ultimately the Bolshevik take over. This contention is explicitly backed by Weiner (2001) who states that the Provisional Government that headed the country post the fall of the Tsar was expected to take the reins of the economy and politics and steer the nation on the path to democratically elect a more permanent government. Instead, the provisional government was mired in political intrigues and mismanagements and complete lack of focus on the